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regulation in the UK-1 and the EU-27 
 
 
Dr Nicole Lindstrom 
Department of Politics 
University of York 
 
Abstract 
The paper examines UK government positions on the regulation of transnational labour 
in the context of Brexit.  Through an analysis of EU regulations on posted workers Ȃ the 
practice whereby a company based in one EU member state sends workers to carry out 
a service in another EU member state Ȃ the paper argues that the UK has consistently 
advocated further liberalization of transnational labour markets in EU level decision-
making, a position consistent with promoting increasingly Ǯǯ
home.  Brexit marks a turning point.  Demands from British workers for stronger ǯǮ-ǯ
worker directive.  Brexit provides a window of opportunity for the revitalization of Ǯǯ-27, without a longstanding veto player at the bargaining table, 
but one more likely focused more on upholding national labour protections than 
initiating new supranational policies. 
 
Introduction  
A central premise of the ǯǮǯ2016 UK 
referendum on EU membership is that the British government should reclaim decision-
making autonomy over policy areas that it erroneously ceded to Brussels.  Exerting Ǯǯ to stem the inflow of EU citizens seeking work in the UK 
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has been a central focus of the Brexit debate.  Many Leave campaigners, as well as many 
Leave voters, blame inward EU migration for declining real wages, increasing precarity 
and growing inequality within the UK.  British politicians continue to make this 
connection as Britain negotiates its exit from the EU.  Labour Leader Jeremy Corbyn ǡǡǮ
underpaid workers from Central Europe to destroy conditions, particularly in the ǯȋAndrew Marr Show 2017).    
 Ǯǯ
narrative in the Brexit debate: that EU membership has forced UK governments to make 
choices that it would not have made otherwise.  The paper argues with respect to the 
regulation of transnational labour that the UK has controlled this policy agenda at home 
as well as in the EU.  It demonstrates that since the re-launch of the Single Market in the  ? ? ? ?ǯ
mutually reinforcing.  In EU-level decision-making, successive UK governments have 
advocated further liberalisation of transnational labour markets while, at the same time, 
generally opposed most supranational initiatives to protect EU citizens from its adverse 
effects (Hopkin 2017, p. 2).  British government positions at the EU level have been, in 
turn, largely consistent with efforts to create more flexible labour markets at home, 
characterized by a steady supply of migrant labour, increasing causualisation, and 
declining real wages (Lavery, Quaglia, and Dannreuther 2018). 
 
The paper develops this argument through an in-depth examination of UK positions on 
EU rules overseeing posted workers, the practice in which a company based in one EU 
member state sends workers to carry out a service in another EU member state.  Since 
3 
 
Ǯǯ	
the EU Constitutional Treaty in 2005, posted workers have served as a lightning rod for 
concerns about non-native EU workers undercutting local wages and employment rules.  
The paper shows how the UK has historically opposed EU measures seeking to 
strengthen supranational regulations overseeing posted workers, often aligning with 
post-socialist ǤǮǯ
economies argue EU regulations undermine single market principles and threaten the 
comparative advantage of lower-waged member states.  The result has been an 
increasingly watered-down EU regulatory framework overseeing posted workers, with 
numerous loopholes enabling firms to post workers on unregulated short-term 
contracts, a practice most pronounced in the construction and transport sectors (Crespy 
and Menz 2015). 
 
Brexit presents a potential critical juncture in this policy trajectory.  In the UK, EU critics 
from the left and right have blamed inward EU migration for declining real wages and 
increasingly precarious employment conditions of British workers, arguments that 
came to a head in the EU referendum.  In the EU, the Juncker Commission has moved 
ahead to strengthen European regulations on posted workers, linking a revised posted 
workers directive to the creation of a European Pillar on Social Rights and a new 
European Labour Authority.  The UK government now finds itself struggling to 
negotiate the competing demands of upholding its long-standing commitment to 
promoting pro-market principles with growing domestic pressures to protect British 
workers from the vagaries of open and deregulated labour markets.  The paper suggests 
this political dilemma can help explain why the UK government has recently 
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demonstrated more reluctance to join with new EU member states in efforts to resist 
recent EU initiatives to tighten secondary legislation overseeing posted workers. 
 
The paper contains three parts.  The first part analyses the UK as an ideal type of liberal 
market economy, in contrast to coordinated market economies of Western Europe, 
focusing on industrial relations and labour market characteristics.  The second section ǡǮ-ǯǮ-ǯȋÚ¡ ?012), have ǯ
liberal labour market model, arguing EU membership has reinforced more than 
challenged domestic employment policies and practices.  The third section then 
analyses how the UK has sought to actively shape EU regulation of transnational labour 
markets by tracing the process through which the UK has intervened in EU-level 
decision-making surrounding posted workers.  The concluding section considers the 
impact of Brexit on labour market regulation in the UK-1 and the EU-27.  
 
The UK and the diversity of EU national welfare capitalisms 
The EU is comprised of diverse national welfare capitalisms that differ both in levels of 
economic development and institutional structures (Scharpf 2002).   Comparative 
European political economy scholars disagree over the extent to which this diversity is 
sustainable in the face of common European rules of economic and social integration 
(see Caporaso and Tarrow 2009; Höpner and Schäfer 2012).  Most observers concede, 
however, that continued diversity of political economic models suggest that governing 
elites retain considerable scope for making effective policy choices at the national level.  
This section examines the UK as an ideal type of a liberal market economy (LME), 
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ǯs (2001) influential varieties of capitalism (VoC) 
framework, focusing on industrial relations and labour market dimensions. 
 
Hall and Soskice (2001) juxtaposes liberal market economies (LMEs) such as the UK 
with coordinated market economies (CMEs) like Germany to demonstrate diverse 
responses of developed economies to common pressures associated with globalization 
and Europeanization.  The dominant logic underlying LMEs, according to Hall and 
Soskice (2001), is that market forces should dictate policy in the form of competitive 
market arrangements, in contrast to CMEs, which pursue denser, non-market forms of 
coordination (Hall and Soskice 2001: 8).  These different logics shape industrial 
relations.  LMEs follow a more pluralist model in which individual employers and 
unions negotiate collective agreements at the firm level, but in which union density and 
collective bargaining coverage remain low.  Industrial relations in CMEs, in contrast, are 
characterised by more corporatist and consensual relationships, whereby firms and 
trade unions negotiate collective agreements at the sectoral or national level.  Union 
density and collective agreement coverage is comparatively higher in CMEs than in 
LMEs, and employment regulations stronger. 
 
Comparing UK industrial relations with other EU member states illuminates many core 
features of the UK as a LME.  Approximately 25 per cent of British workers belong to 
unions, compared to over 60 per cent in Finland, Sweden and Denmark (OECD 2017).  
Collective bargaining coverage is nearly half of the EU average at 30 per cent, and 
considerably lower than states like Austria, Belgium or France where almost all workers 
are covered under collective agreements (ETUI 2017).  The UK is also one of a handful 
of EU states that allow so-Ǯ ǯ
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that do not guarantee a set number of hours in any given week.  Most other EU member 
states do not allow such contracts, or if, so, the state tightly regulates them, and 
employers use them rarely.  As of 2017, nearly three per cent of the British workforce 
were on zero hour contracts (ONS 2018).  Finally, UK average hourly wage costs are 
lower than other West European states.  British workers taking home an average of 20 
euros per hour places them at the EU average.  Yet excluding lower wage post-socialist ǡǯ-15, 
with exception of Greece and Portugal (Fromm, Contreras and Welz 2015).   
 
Since the 2008 global financial crisis, UK workers suffered the biggest drop in average 
real wages of any EU country except Greece.  Between 2007 and 2017, the median real 
wage in the UK fell by over five per cent (Costa and Manchin 2017).  This decline in UK 
real wages stands in contrast to other EU states, such as Germany, Sweden and Austria, 
that have experienced real wage growth rates of over ten per cent during this same 
period.  The UK has also exhibited slow productivity growth levels since the financial Ǥǯte Ȃ or the ratio of output of goods and services 
produced compared with inputs Ȃ by 2016 was 18 per cent below the G7 average and a 
full 36 percentage points behind Germany (ONS 2017).   Some analysts have explained ǮǯǯǤ
restricted wage growth, combined with flexible labour market policies, reduces the cost 
of labour to British-based firms, which, in turn, decreases their incentive to invest in 
capital improvements, including enhancing the skills and training of its workforce 
(Bryson and Forth 2015). 
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The 2016 referendum in the UK on EU membership coincided with the most significant 
contraction of the British economy since the Great Depression (Hopkin 2017, p. 6).   The 
key question raised in the referendum was whether EU membership has a net positive 
or negative effect on the UK economy, including the situation of British workers.  Leave 
campaigners attributed blame to the EU, and inward migration of EU workers for the 
economic hardships facing so-Ǯǯworkers and their communities 
(Goodwin and Heath 2016).  Remain campaigners, on the other hand, stressed that EU 
membership, and the inward migration of (non-UK) EU workers to the UK, had a 
positive effect on the economy, supported by research showing the EU migrants 
contributed positively to employment rates, public finances, and, except for certain 
lower-skilled sectors, wages (Portes and Forte 2017).   Both campaigns focused 
relatively little attention, however, on the impact of specific EU rules and regulations on 
the UK political economy or, in turn, how the UK sought to influence those rules and 
regulations as an EU member over the past four decades.   A closer inspection of these 
processes helps illuminaǮǯ
relationship to the EU; it has actively shaped those rules.  
 
European integration and the UK liberal market labour model 
To analyse the impact of European integration on national capitalist models, one can 
consider three main dimensions of European integration.  Ǯǯȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǮ-ǯȋÚ¡ ? ? ? ?Ȍ
informal barriers to the free movement of goods, capital, services and people.  ǮǯǮ-ǯ, on the other hand, involves creating binding EU-level 
rules regulating cross-Ǥ	ǡǮǯ
EU deploying soft forms of pressure to foster cross-national harmonization.  The 
8 
 
following section examines these three dimensions of European integration and their 
relationship to the UK labour market model. 
 
Market-enforcing integration and the UK labour market model  Ǯǡǯingle market membership promises the free flow 
of services and persons (in addition to goods and capital) across national borders.  
Single market rules on free movement of persons allows any citizen of an EU member 
state to seek work in another EU member state, without restriction, for at least three 
months.  Free movement of services involves the movement of persons since it grants 
the right of service providers, such as plumbers, architects or accountants, to provide 
their services freely in another member state, subject to certain conditions such as 
compliance with national or local licensing rules.  Single market rules also allow service 
firms to hire workers from one EU member state to carry out contracts in another, what 
the EU has termed posting of workers.   The principle underlying efforts to facilitate 
more seamless cross-border movement of persons and services is the same as logic 
driving the single market more generally: to enhance economic growth, competitiveness 
and productivity by allocating reǡǮǡǯ
across borders.   
 
The UK has always been a staunch supporter of single market freedoms.  Margaret 
Thatcher was instrumental in re-launching the single market in the 1980s, with her 
cabinet minister, Lord Cockfield, serving as a key architect of the 1986 Single European Ǥǯǡȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǡǮ
domestic policy of Ǥǯǡǯ
9 
 
ǯǣ
unions and fostering greater deregulation and commodification of labour (Peck and 
Ticknell 2007).  ǯ-
intensive readjustment policies, such as skills training and regional development 
initiatives, leading to a rapid decline of industrial regions hit hardest by these reforms.  
Internal labour mobility, or citizens moving within national borders in search of 
employment, served as one low-cost means of adjustment.  The Single Market created 
another mechanism of adjustment but scaled to the EU level.  In her 1988 Lancaster 
House speech heralding tǡǮǯȋ
Thatcher Foundation 2017a). 
 
Nearly one million British citizens have taken advantage of the right of free movement 
of persons to live and work in other EU member states, with retirees and high-skilled 
workers comprising the greatest proportion of outward migrants.  A far more politically 
significant consequence of free movement has been the inward migration of EU workers 
to the UK, especially after the 2004 and 2007 eastward enlargements, which brought 
ten post-socialist states with lower wages and levels of development into the EU.  
Thatcher endorsed eastward enlargement (Margaret Thatcher Foundation 2017b).  Her 
successor, John Major, gave the green light to allowing post-socialist states to apply for 
full EU membership, based in part on the calculation that widening the EU would come 
at the expense of deepening (Schimmelfennig 2001: 53).  When post-socialist states 
finally joined the EU in 2004, the UK under the Blair government was one of only three 
EU states, in addition to Ireland and Sweden, which did not impose temporary 
restrictions on migrants from new EU member states.  Between 2004 and 2009, 1.5 
10 
 
million citizens from new member states migrated to the UK (Sumption and Somerville 
2010: 13).  By 2017 around 2.4 million EU nationals are working in the UK, comprising 
seven per cent of the UK work force (The Migration Observatory 2017).  
 
In sum, the EU has alwayǮ-ǯ
eliminate national barriers to the free movement of goods and capital, and, to a lesser 
extent, services and people, to enhance both national and European competitiveness 
(Jabko 2012).   Thatcher and successive governments have supported this liberalizing 
project since it has been largely compatible with a process of domestic restructuring 
away from government intervention in the labour market.  As Hopkin (2017, p. 4) 
argues, the result is that British workers, more than workers in any other EU member ǡǮǲǳǤǯ
governments have made political choices to forgo options designed to shield workers 
from competitive pressures, such as taking advantage of transition periods on allowing 
EU migrants to access domestic labour markets.  Moreover, while other EU member 
states have exhibited more sustained, if tepid, support for creating more supranational 
forms of social protection to mitigate the adverse effects of European market 
liberalization, the UK government has traditionally been far more skeptical of, and in 
some cases actively opposed to, Ǯ-ǯǤ 
 
Market-correcting integration and the British labour market model 
Throughout the recent history of European integration, European leaders have 
generally sought to accompany any move to remove barriers to free movement with 
counter-moves designed to embed markets in a pan-European society (Caporaso and 
Tarr ? ? ? ?ȌǤǯ
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vision of European integration as a solely market-making project with his efforts to 
include a social dimension in the Single European Act.  When the 1992 Maastricht 
Treaty expanded ǯ-wide social and employment 
policies, John Major secured a UK opt out from this new social chapter.  Tony Blair opted  ? ? ? ?ǤǡǮǯ
more socially protective form of free-market capitalism was generally consistent with ǯǮǯȋ
ǡ
and Liddle 2006).  Since Maastricht, the EU has passed six legally binding pieces of 
employment legislation.  These include the Working Time Directive (WTD), which limits 
working hours and guarantees holidays, and the Temporary Agency Work Directive 
(TAWD), which requires equal treatment of part-time, temporary, and agency workers.   
 
When it comes to the Ǯǯ-making initiatives, UK 
governments have sought to negotiate exemptions in cases where they failed to achieve Ǯǯ-making phase.  For example, the UK 
pushed for an exemption allowing workers to exceed the limit set out in the WTD.  In 
implementing the TAWD, moreover, the UK secured an exception making rules on equal 
treatment applicable only to employees who worked a minimum of 12 weeks.   While 
the UK successfully negotiated exemptions in implementing certain pieces of EU 
legislation, in general the UK has been in full legal compliance with these directives 
(Falkner, et. al. 2007).  EU membership has more generally expanded the rights of 
workers in the UK who, by being a citizen of an EU member state, enjoy full rights and 
protections under EU treaties.  EU citizens can appeal to the European Court of Justice ȋȌȋǮǯȌǡs a demonstrable conflict between EU law and national law (the 
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ǮǯȌǤ	
of the European Union, which guarantees UK citizens a range of economic, social and 
political rights.   
 
Horizontal integration and the British labour market model 	ǡǡǮǯ
to foster horizontal cooperation in areas where the EU has no formal competence, 
including social, employment, education and ǤǮǡǯȂ or a kind of soft sanctioning through peer or public pressure Ȃ is the primary 
means through which the EU seeks to harmonize activities across EU member states, in 
addition to creating opportunities at the EU level for actors to share best practices.  In ǡǯǤǯ-centered approach to addressing poverty, for instance, was Ǯ ǯȋ ? ? ? ?, p. 
255).  Just months after David Cameron took power in 2010, the UK signed up to the  ? ? ? ?ǡǮǡ
sustainable and incǯǤǡ ? ? ? ǯȂ excluding education targets, where the UK Ǥȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍǯ
these softeǡǮǯǣ
governments display no particular intention to antagonize the European Commission, 
and dutifully provide the required information, but, at the same time, exhibit little 
willingness to engage meaningfully with the process. 
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In sum, all EU member state governments must reconcile tensions between EU 
pressures and national labour and social welfare regimes.   Yet states, and social actors 
within them, respond to EU pressures differently depending on where they fall on the 
continuum between liberal market and coordinated market economies.  Negative 
integration is more likely to be opposed in those member states with stronger 
coordinated market economy models, where EU rules are portrayed as a threat to 
national social and labour protections and practices.  Positive integration, on the other 
hand, is more likely to encounter resistance in liberal market economies like the UK, 
with influential actors framing EU interventions in labour and social policies as 
undermining free market principles (see Lindstrom 2014).  The next section examines 
in more depth how the UK worked to shape EU rules overseeing posted workers, Ǯ-ǯreserve or Ǯ-ǯǤ 
 
Ǯǯ 
Posted workers comprise a relatively small part of the European labour market. In 
2017, employers posted over one and a half million EU workers to another EU state to 
carry out temporary contracts, with the biggest numbers in construction and transport.  
Posted workers could involve a German construction firm winning a UK government 
contract to build a power station in Northern England and posting workers from 
Slovakia to fulfill part of the contract.  Likewise, a UK road haulage firm transporting 
goods from Italy to the UK could hire Spanish drivers to cover that route.  While their 
numbers are relatively small, posted workers have received a significant degree of 
attention in public debates over the impact of free movement of workers on domestic 
wages and employment.  The posting of workers has raised widespread concerns about 
14 
 
ǮǯǡǮ evading existing social regulations ǯȋ ? ? ? ?, p. 4).   This section ǯǡ
shaping EU policy on this issue. 
 
The EU passed the Posted Workers Directive (96/71/EC) in 1996. The aim of the ǣǯ
the EU and to prevent social dumping.  The Directive required that workers are entitled 
by EU law to core rights in the receiving state, including minimum wages, minimum rest 
periods and paid annual leave.  The Directive sought to alleviate concerns in the 1990s 
that firms posting southern European workers to carry out contracts in northern 
European states sought to undercut local collective bargaining agreements.  Concerns 
about social dumping heated up again in 2004 when then Single Market Commissioner 
Frits Bolkestein proposed a new Services Directive.  The aim of the Directive was to 
strengthen the rights of free movement of services within the EU by eliminating what 
Bolkestein argued was a plethora of national formal and informal barriers preventing 
foreign service providers from doing business in another EU state.  One means of 
accomplishing this goal was a ǮǯǯǤ
plumbing firm, for example, establishing a plumbing business in France could, under ǯǡs Polish plumbers the Polish minimum wage and be subject 
to Polish employment laws and regulations.    
 
New post-socialist EU member states supported the country of origin principle, arguing 
that it would strengthen their comparative advantage and enhance single market 
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competitiveness more generally (Crespy and Gajewska 2010).  Yet the proposed 
Directive spurred considerable protest in Western Europe.  Trade unions and other civil 
society groups organizing large demonstrations in Brussels and Strasbourg.  Most West ǯǡǣǤǯ
principle and the Services Directive more generally.  The final 2006 Services Directive 
was a watered-ǯǤǮǯȋ
and Nedergaard 2012).  But the Services Directive left open legal questions of how to 
balance the right to free movement of services with the right of governments to require 
foreign service providers to abide by certain national rules and practices. 
 
A series of subsequent European Court of Justice (ECJ) cases weighed in on this 
question.  In three prominent cases Ȃ Laval (2007), Viking (2007) and Rüffert (2008) Ȃ 
service firms carrying out work in other EU states argued that industrial actions or 
government policies designed to force them to uphold local collective bargaining 
agreements violated their freedom to provide services under EU law (Joerges and Rödl 
2009).  In the first case, a Latvian construction firm (Laval) won a Swedish government 
contract, posted workers from Latvia, and paid them less than rate set by collective 
agreement.  The Swedish union organized a blockade of the building site, prevented 
Laval from fulfilling the contract, and Laval subsequently sued the Swedish unions for 
damages.  The second case involved a Finnish ferry company (Viking) that posted 
workers from Estonia, and subsequently sued the International Transport Workers 
Union for organizing a boycott that Viking argued violated its right under EU law to 
provide services across borders.  Rüffert involved a Polish firm that argued that a Lower 
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Saxony law requiring any recipient of government contracts to abide by collective 
bargaining agreements violated their right to free movement under EU law.   
 
The ECJ sided with the firms in all three cases and awarded damages (Viking settled out 
of Court).  The Court argued that requiring foreign firms to abide by non-statutory ǯ
infringed on their right to establishment.  In an analysis of member state legal briefs 
submitted to ECJ hearings on the three cases, all new post-socialist EU member states 
sided with Laval, while all West European governments sided with the trade unions, 
with one exception: the UK.  Not only did the UK argue that the industrial actions had ǯts to provide services freely across EU borders; its brief went ǡǮǲǳǯȋ ? ? ? ?, p. 1315).  The judgements, by 
reducing the ability of trade unions and local governments to uphold non-statutory 
collective agreements, struck a blow to states like Denmark, Sweden, Germany and 
Austria with industrial relations models focused around more informal sector-wide 
collective bargaining agreements, and were seen to reduce the power of labour vis-à-vis 
capital more generally (Papadopoulous and Roumpakis 2013). 
 
Since these ECJ judgements, trade unions, with support of many EU member states, have 
pressured the EU to close loopholes in the PWD, including cracking- down on employers 
who seek to bypass EU laws overseeing posted workers.  In 2014 the EU passed an Ǯǯ
rules more strictly. Jean-Claude Juncker promised to go further, supporting a revision of 
the PWD that would ensure, as he stated in his 2016 State of the Union speech, that all 
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Ǯǯȋ
Commission 2016a).   The revised PWD proposal promises to enforce a stricter set of 
rules governing posted workers. The proposed legislation targets so-Ǯǯǡ
another EU state to recruit temporary workers to carry out contracts.  It also promises 
to put collective bargaining agreements on more equal footing as minimum wage rates, 
which is especially important to Denmark or Sweden that do not have statutory 
minimum wages.  The proposal has been promoted more generally as way to counteract 
what EU Commissioner for Economic Affairs, Pierre Moscovici, describes as the Ǯǯ
many EU member states (Financial Times 2016). 
 
Two months after the Commission proposed the legislation in March 2016, parliaments 
from eleven EU member states triggered the subsidiarity control mechanism, better ǮǯǤ-socialist 
member states, minus Slovenia, and plus Denmark (whose parliament, diverging from 
the other signatories, argued that the revised PWD did not include strong enough 
protections for upholding collective bargaining agreements).  The participating 
parliaments argued that the revised PWD violates the principle of subsidiarity in that 
national rules should cover posted workers.  Not only did the signatories easily exceed 
the one-third threshold; it was only the third time that national parliaments had 
successfully triggered the yellow yard since the Lisbon Treaty entered force in 2009.  
ǯ ? ? ? ?ǡǯ
yellow card initiative was a notable departure from past actions.  Indeed, the UK 
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decided to submit a collective opinion with France, Italy, Portugal, and Spain arguing ǯǤ 
 
The European Commission responded to the yellow card challenge by upholding the Ǯǯ
is in full conformity with the subsidiarity principle.  Commissioner for Employment, 
Social Affairs, Skills and Labour MobiliǡǡǣǮ
Juncker Commission remains firmly committed to the free movement of people on the ǡǯȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤǯasis on clarity and fairness was consistent ǡǮǯ
nodded to concerns of trade unions and states such as Denmark about protecting 
collective agreements.  CEE leaders condemned ǯǤǡǡǡǮǡ
work on topics that are unifying, not divisive. Having such a divisive decision is not in ǯǯȋRobinson and Foy 2016).  Another senior diplomat ǮǡǡǮǯǳȋRobinson and Foy 2016).1  
 
The revised PWD continued through the legislative process.  On 16 October 2017, the 
European Parliament Committee on Employment and Social Affairs adopted the draft 
report, with 32 votes in favor and 13 against, thereby starting formal negotiations with 
the Council (European Parliament 2017).  A European Commission official cited the 
dedicated work of the two rapporteurs Ȃ Elisabeth Morin-Chartier (EPP, France) and 
Agnes Jongerius (S&D, Netherlands) Ȃ as being a key factor in the proposalǯs adoption 
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with overwhelming consensus (personal interview, 26 October 2017).  Of the 13 MEPs 
on the Committee who voted against the report, 12 were from new EU member states.  
The one UK Conservative Party MEP on the Committee, Anthea McIntyre, abstained, 
thereby diverging from her two fellow European Conservatives and Reformists Group 
members from the Polish Law and Justice Party who opposed the measure. 
 
The proposal headed to the Council, which agreed to the general approach of the 
revised PWD with 21 member states voting in favour, four against, and three abstaining.  
The CoǯǮ
comparable permanent workers, between part-time workers and between temporary ǯȋncil of the European Union 2017, p. 3).   In a concession to 
Denmark, the Council amended the Commission proposal to include a specific clause: Ǯǥ
the right or freedom to strike or to take any other action covered by the specific 
industrial relations systems in Member States, in accordance with national law and/or ǤǯǡǮ
the right to negotiate, conclude and enforce collective agreements and to take collective Ǥǯ
sought to address concerns since the Laval and Viking judgements about social dumping 
the proposaǮǯǮǡbut not be limited to, all the elements of minimum rates of ǯȋǯǡCouncil of the European Union 2017, p. 6). 
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Four member states voted against the proposal: Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland.  
Two member states abstained: the UK and Ireland.  Leading up to the vote in the 
Council, the UK advanced no clear position.  Indeed, there was some speculation on 
whether the UK would vote in favour of the adoption of the PWD, which would have 
represented a significant departure from its previous positions that had consistently 
opposed the tightening EU regulations of posted workers (personal interview, 26 
October 2017).   Member states have until 2022 to implement the directive once passed, 
which the UK government might have calculated would allow them to delay 
implementation until the end of any Brexit transition period.  Another explanation for ǯǡǡe directive is a shift in political 
calculations.  Labour has used the issue of posted workers to acknowledge the concerns 
of many of its members about the impact of EU migrants on wages and employment, 
particularly in the construction and transport sectors, and to place the blame on both 
exploitative employers and the Tory government.  If the UK had decided to vote against 
the proposal in the Council, its decision might have gone unnoticed, at least in the 
popular British press.  Yet Brexit has arguably increased the possibility that British 
government officials believe that any decision they make in Brussels could be open to 
increased scrutiny and demands for accountability at home. 
 
Regulating transnational labour markets after Brexit 
If a central theme of the Leave campaign in the UK referendum on EU membership was Ǯǡǯ
once it regained ǤǯǮ
ǯ
promises to copy all existing EU legislation into domestic UK law, allowing the Ǯǡǯse laws as necessary (BBC 2017).  The 
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question remains what EU employment legislation the UK Parliament is likely to appeal, 
amend or extend. One of the clearest possibilities for concrete policy change after Brexit ǡǮ-ǯ
the WTD or the TAWD.  International Trade Secretary Liam Fox, for example, declared, Ǯlating the labour market. Political objections must be ǯȋD'Ancona 2017).  Former Thatcher cabinet member and House of Lords 
peer Nigel Lawson heralded the wide-ranging program of deregulation in the 1980s as ǮǯǣǮ
of the EU, we have the opportunity to do this on an even larger scale with the massive ǤǯȋRayner and 
Hope 2017).  
 
Yet Brexit has exposed a deeper ideological divide on the right between traditional 
small-government forces in the Tory Party and the more protectionist demands of an 
increasing share of their voters.  The poorer and lower-skilled voters who supported 
the Leave campaign were led to believe that Brexit will lead to a significant reduction in 
immigration and, subsequently, higher wages and better employment conditions for 
British workers (Goodwin and Heath 2016).  Divisions within the Tory party have been 
on display most clearly over the issue of the rights of EU citizens to free movement 
during the Brexit transition period.  EU negotiators have demanded EU citizens enjoy 
full rights under EU law until the transition period ends in 2021.   In February 2018, 
seemingly succumbing to pressure from hardline Brexiteers in her Cabinet, Theresa Ǯǯ-off date of 2019.   
Yet a month later, May climbed down from that promise and agreed to keep full free 
movement for EU citizens during the implementation period.  Adam Marshall, director 
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general of the British Chamber of Commerce remarked on the agreement, Ǯ
be pleased that during a time of record high labour shortages, the government is 
showing a pragmatic approach to iǯȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤers criticized the Ǯǯ, bound by EU law but giving the UK no voice 
in EU decision-making during the transition. 
 
Brexit also creates dilemmas for the opposition Labour Party.  Corbyn warned during Ǯǯ
rights, with the Conservative government using Brexit to slash protection for workers 
(Stewart 2016).  After the referendum, Labour leaders joined British labour unions in 
demanding that the government retains EU employment regulations and cracks down 
on firms using migrant labour to undercut British wages and social standards after 
Brexit.  Yet many critics of the EU on the British left Ȃ including Corbyn Ȃ have long Ǯ-ǯfosters a race to the bottom in national ǤǮ-ǯǤ
nan and Hanna ȋ ? ? ? ?ǣ ? ?ȌǡǡǮǡ
new supranational options for the regulation of capital, ended up surrendering the tools 
they ǤǯǮǯt of a larger agenda 
amongst Labour leaders to use Brexit as an opportunity to break with the liberal market 
national business model that has shaped the UK political economy for the past three 
decades and move towards a more organized, coordinated form of national capitalism 
(Jones 2016; Nölke 2017).   
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As for the remaining EU-27, many proponents of a more social Europe consider Brexit Ǯ-ǯ
employment rights and regulations Ǯǯ
the EU decision-making table (Watkins 2016).  Van Parijs (2016) argues that to ǮǯǯǮ-ǯ
social and labour protections, tǮǯthat 
includes Ǯ-economic institutions that organize at least part of redistribution on a ǯ.  The Juncker Commission has hesitated to initiate the kind of 
redistributive initiatives advocated by Van Parijs.  Yet the Commission has proposed 
numerous initiatives, such as a European Pillar on Social Rights or a proposed European ǡǯǮǤǯD points to EU leaders moving away from the ǯǮ-ǯ, whereby EU free movement 
principles supersede national social and labour protections, and towards a decoupling 
logic whereby national social and labour protections are kept separate from EU law. 
 
Building a stronger Social Europe after Brexit faces three key challenges.  First, the Ǯ-ǯ
by the UK and actively supported by post-socialist new EU member states, has become 
far more fractured after Brexit.  Yet this case study also shows that new EU member 
states are well organized Ǯ-ǯȋsee Schweiger and Visvizi 2018).  Second, while the current Ǯ	ǯǮ
ǯǡleaders can use the ǤǮ
will be able to remain in the mainstream of Europǡǯ
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ǡǮd to be something ǡǯȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤǮǯǡ-wage, low-tax offshore 
haven placing indirect competitive pressures on the continent (Posen 2016).  Finally, 
EU-27 member states are not immune to the pull of exclusionary nationalist populism 
that fueled Brexit.  The dilemma facing governments across the EU is whether and how 
to address growing perceptions that migration is to blame for increased social 
dislocation since the global financial crisis.  Increasing turns towards more protectionist Ǯ-ǯǡ to decouple more policy 
areas from EU control, may be more likely than supranational initiatives to resuscitate ǮǤǯ 
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